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INTRODUCTION 
By electing to leave the European Union, the United 
Kingdom has chosen, among many other things, to leave 
the customs union and the single market that includes 
all member states and reassert its status as an individual 
member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In doing so 
it will take sole responsibility for the control and governance 
of its external trade policy with all other WTO members 
(including the EU) within the framework of WTO rules. This 
Briefing Paper aims to explore the nature of those WTO 
commitments and how they might impact the UK from the 
yet-to-be-set date of the UK’s exit from the EU (B(rexit) 
day).
UK TRADE POLICY PRIOR TO BREXIT
The UK will remain a full member of the EU until it completes 
the negotiation on the terms of its exit. This could take up 
to 2 years after the UK first triggers Article 50 of the Treaty 
on European Union, unless this period is extended with the 
approval of all EU member states. Until the exit date, legal 
competence for UK trade policy still rests with the EU and 
its implementation is in the hands of the EU Commission. 
All existing EU agreements with other WTO members would 
still apply and the treatment of UK imports from and exports 
to EU partners and third countries should receive exactly the 
same treatment as before the referendum.
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WHAT HAPPENS ON B-DAY?
In principle the UK loses its status as an EU member of 
the WTO and takes up its membership as an individual 
member of the WTO. As far as UK imports are concerned, 
what happens is in the hands of the British Government. 
Theoretically, it could continue to apply the same measures 
as on B-day-1 which would be consistent with the tariff and 
services schedules it agreed to in the WTO’s Uruguay Round 
and as subsequently revised to take account of subsequent 
enlargements of the EU. If it decides not to apply the same 
measures, and insofar as this results in higher barriers to 
trade, this will give rise to renegotiations with affected WTO 
members. What follows assumes that the British Government 
will not raise barriers above those applied by the EU, but 
focusses on how other WTO members are going to treat UK 
exports. There are three classes of trading partners:  
• the EU-27 
• those countries which had a preferential trading 
arrangement with the EU-28 on B-day -1 but only with 
the EU-27 on B-day  and
• those countries which have a so-called Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) relationship with the EU-28 based on 
tariffs and services schedules negotiated in the WTO, 
e.g. the USA.
The post B-day relationship with the EU-27 is complex 
because it is unclear whether the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union allows negotiation of the post-Brexit 
arrangements between the UK and the EU-27 in parallel 
with the Article 50 mandated negotiations on the terms of 
the exit.  If the reality is that the EU-27 would not allow a 
new trade relationship to be negotiated until the UK has left 
the EU the default position will be that both sides treat each 
other on MFN terms, which is unlikely to be desirable for 
either side. An alternative is to extend the status quo.
THE  WORLD  TRADE  ORGAN ISAT ION :  A  SAFETY  NET  FOR  A  POST-BREX I T  UK  TRADE  POL ICY?
But that might be unacceptable in the UK if it includes 
the free movement of labour (not a WTO subject per se) 
and unacceptable to the EU-27 if it does not.  Other WTO 
members may complain that MFN is violated by such an 
extension of the status quo, but any associated WTO dispute 
proceedings will take a lot of time, so that even if some 
WTO members bring a case, in practice the UK government 
and the EU will have time to deal with the issues. Indeed, 
WTO members might allow both parties transitional periods 
or temporary waivers to allow the EU-UK negotiations to 
continue after B-day without pressure from Geneva. Of 
course that does assume goodwill on all sides which should 
not be taken for granted. The post B-day relationship with 
countries that have FTAs with the EU may paradoxically be 
easier because they may be more relaxed about informally 
discussing allowing the existing bilateral arrangements 
to continue beyond B-day while a formal FTA or similar 
agreement is drawn up. Such goodwill is likely to be a 
function of political factors as well as of whether or not the 
partner country involved thinks it will benefit from reverting 
to MFN. Hence the final outcomes are likely to vary across 
partners.  
Finally for countries with which the EU currently has MFN-
based trade relations, a continuation of that after B-day 
with both the EU and the UK would seem the line of least 
resistance.
Hence it is possible that relations with all three classes of 
partner will revert to an MFN-based relationship grounded 
on the WTO. There are many dimensions to this so-called 
‘WTO-Option’ which the UK Trade Policy Observatory will 
explore in detail in future; this Briefing Paper sketches some 
preliminary thoughts about the challenges that it raises in 
three critical areas of trade: goods, services and government 
procurement.
TRADE IN GOODS
UK exports to the EU were 44% of total UK exports and 
54% of total UK imports in 2015. All of this was carried out 
with zero tariffs and very low non tariff barriers courtesy of 
the single market. If that trade were carried out on an MFN 
basis then the average MFN tariff levied by the EU is 5.3%.1 
However, at a more detailed level around 16% of UK exports 
to the EU-27 would have faced tariffs of more than 7%; of that 
16%, half was represented by motor cars which would face a 
tariff of 10%. 
1  MFN applied tariff, unweighted average, total trade 2014, source WTO tariff profiles.
A similar story can be told of trade between the UK and the 
51 countries that the EU had an FTA with in 2015. Trade 
with those countries in 2015 represented 14% of UK exports 
and 11% of imports; UK exports would have faced average 
MFN tariffs that varied from under 5% (Israel) to almost 30% 
(Egypt) and perhaps most notably an average 17% tariff into 
Korea. At a more detailed level tariffs could be considerably 
higher. 
Overall therefore and based on 2015 statistics, UK exports 
could face significant MFN tariffs on the 58% of total exports 
that go to the EU and markets where the UK currently 
receives tariff free entry.  Similarly the UK could end up 
levying tariffs on the 65% of imports that originate from the 
EU and other preferential partners that previously attracted 
no tariffs, with consequent negative impacts on both British 
consumers and on firms dependent on imported inputs. 
APPLYING AN MFN TRADE REGIME ON GOODS 
There are potential administrative problems involved in 
applying EU MFN tariff schedules in the UK. Under the WTO 
Agreement on Agriculture, some agricultural imports from the 
rest of the world face tariff rate quotas (TRQs), which allow 
the entry of a specified quota of imports at a below-normal 
tariff rate. These quotas are defined at the EU level, and in 
order to extract itself and claim its share of the TRQ, the 
UK will need to negotiate with both the EU-27 and the WTO 
members that take advantage of the TRQs. 
A similar problem arises from the cap on expenditure on 
trade-distorting agricultural subsidies that the EU negotiated 
in the Uruguay Round (the so-called blue box). The division 
of this right to subsidise will again require the agreement 
of both the EU-27 and other WTO members. This is doubly 
complicated because the EU commitments to the WTO have 
not yet been updated to take account of the enlargements of 
2004 and 2007.  
This unpacking process could take time and could lead 
to resistance among WTO members who feel that the 
reallocation between the UK and the EU may disadvantage 
them. Hence even if the division of the TRQs and the blue box 
formed part of the Article 50 negotiations on UK withdrawal, 
it would still then in principle have to be negotiated with the 
WTO membership.
Of course, the UK could unilaterally choose not to operate 
a TRQ system and apply the low, within-quota, tariff to all 
imports of the relevant commodities. Similarly the UK, with its 
new found margin for manoeuvre, could unilaterally abolish 
trade-distorting agricultural subsidies and reduce blue box 
expenditure to zero. Such moves would be welcomed by WTO 
members but would doubtless face resistance from the UK 
agricultural sector.
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SERVICES TRADE 
The United Kingdom has a vital interest in trade in services.  
In 2014 the total value of UK services exports (excluding 
transportation, travel and financial services) stood at about 
£120 billion and imports at £55 billion. Approximately half 
these flows are with European countries (£59bn are exported 
to Europe,1 £34 to the Americas, £20bn to Asia).  Europe is 
the single most important trading partner across all major 
types of services.  The most important services exports are 
in professional, scientific and technical activities, followed by 
information and communications.  Financial and insurance 
activities are third.
SERVICES TRADE WITH THE EU UNDER THE WTO 
GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES (GATS)
There is no uniform EU external trade policy for services. The 
EU’s GATS schedule sets out a framework for market access 
which is punctuated by individual countries’ derogations in 
particular subsectors and modes of supply. For example, 
while the conditions for establishing commercial presence 
(mode 3) in life insurance are similar across most EU 
members, those pertaining to the legal sector (advice on 
foreign law) differ widely; e.g. in France non-EU firms are not 
allowed to establish branches under their own name or to 
form partnerships with locally licensed lawyers. Thus the UK’s 
“WTO option” in services will require negotiations with all 
individual EU member states as well as with the Commission. 
The extent to which the UK’s access to the EU market would 
deteriorate based upon the EU’s GATS schedule is difficult to 
assess because market access based on currently applied 
measures is typically better than in the GATS schedules. The 
GATS schedules thus impart only a lower bound for currently 
applied (or de facto) market access and national treatment 
condition; these may be quite favourable but could be 
removed at any time and thus are afflicted by considerable 
uncertainty that does not pertain while the UK is within the 
EU.
SERVICES IN EU FTA: THE CASE OF KOREA
The EU has a flagship trade deal with Korea which is deeper 
than any of its other agreements. If the deal does not apply 
to the UK after Brexit, the UK would lose the considerably 
greater access it provides (compared with Korea’s GATS 
schedules). It is not easy to compare the FTA and the GATS 
schedule because they differ in structure: for example, the 
FTA incorporates rules about the establishment of foreign 
firms into its investment conditions rather than as an element
1  Switzerland is included in these figures and is an important export destination for UK 
services.
of services trade. Nonetheless, in many specific areas 
the EU-Korea agreement goes well beyond Korea’s GATS 
commitments. For example, in financial services it opens 
up the Korean market in several respects, and in particular 
allows EU firms the right to offer new financial services as 
they develop. It also opens telecommunications markets by 
reducing local ownership requirements, as well as the legal 
services and shipping services markets. The Korea-EU FTA is 
similar to the Korea-US FTA, so that if the UK could no longer 
trade under the FTA, it would suffer disadvantages relative to 
both the rest of the EU and to the USA. 
Article 7.14 of the Korea-EU FTA includes a clause that 
requires each party to extend to the other any liberalisation 
that it may grant in any future FTA that it signs with another 
party. Hence if a future Korea-UK FTA offered the UK very 
favourable terms, these would have to be extended to the 
whole of EU. Thus even if the UK were prepared to offer a very 
deep relationship to Korea, this clause makes it unlikely that 
Korea would be prepared to improve significantly on what it 
has already offered under Korea-EU.
THE UK’S PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND THE WTO 
GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT (GPA)
The world market in government procurement is reported to 
represent the equivalent of 15-20% of GDP by the European 
Commission (EC), but because of the various restrictions on 
coverage, less than half of that is actually contestable under 
the GPA. The EC also reports the EU procurement market at 
14% of GDP and the annual value of procurement activities 
opened up to international competition by the 43 GPA parties 
amounts to US$ 1.3 trillion.
The GPA opens up certain government procurement in 
member countries to suppliers from other GPA-members. 
However those suppliers must also be able to get their goods 
and services into the country in the first place, which is 
conditioned by the country’s import polices which, in turn, 
are bound by its GATT and GATS schedules. Thus unlocking 
the huge procurement market will typically require the 
negotiation of both the GPA and the WTO schedules. 
An under-appreciated issue is that the UK is covered by the 
GPA only through its membership of the EU: the EU ratified 
the GPA on behalf of its members but the UK has not, so 
far, done so individually. If the UK does not ratify/accede 
the interim, its exit from the EU will undermine its rights of 
access to all GPA members’ procurement markets. It will also 
remove any obligation on the UK to allow foreign suppliers to 
tender for its procurement contracts, which would severely 
reduce competition and create serious value-for-money 
challenges. Yet, until it has left the EU, the UK will not 
formally have the standing to deal with the GPA.
CONCLUSIONS
The WTO provides the UK with a useful framework for re-
negotiating its trade relationships both with and outside the 
EU, but the analysis above suggests that:
• For goods, the UK should adopt existing EU tariff 
schedules for imports with the aim of maintaining 
stability and facilitating swift negotiations with the EU 
and the other members of the WTO.
• If the EU does not wish to begin formal negotiations 
until after the Article 50 process is complete the WTO 
option will govern UK-EU trade relations. This will be 
costly for both parties relative to the status quo.
• With respect to preferential trade agreements between 
the EU and third countries, the UK should push to 
initiate informal discussions immediately to maintain 
these preferential trade relationships post-Brexit. If that 
is not possible, WTO MFN terms will again come into 
play.
• Reverting to WTO terms of trade under the Agreement 
on Agriculture poses complexities, as negotiation within 
and beyond the EU is unavoidable. The UK must make 
it a priority to initiate these negotiations, as concluding 
them is in the best interest of both the UK and the EU. 
• Basing services trade with the EU and Korea on 
GATS schedules after B-day will result in a significant 
deterioration in access for British services compared 
with the single market or the Korea-EU FTA. As a 
priority, the UK should aim to maintain as close to  
current levels of access to the EU-27 and the Korean 
markets and to extend Korean style access terms in 
any new FTA it negotiates.
• The GPA delivers important access for British exports 
to government procurement markets in many other 
countries and increases competition in the British 
market. If the UK does not ratify/accede to the GPA in 
advance, B-day threatens to reduce exports and create 
serious value-for-money challenges in the UK.
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The UK will undertake an unprecedented redesign/reboot 
of its trade policy over the coming months and years. This 
Briefing Paper is a first foray by UKPTO into the mass of 
issues that will arise from that redesign. Over the next 
six months we will provide a series of Briefing Papers and 
meetings in London and around the UK to generate informed 
scrutiny of the process and the substance of making Britain’s 
new trade policy.
FURTHER INFORMATION
This document was written by by Jim Rollo, Ingo Borchert, 
Kamala Dawar, Peter Holmes and Alan Winters with 
inputs from other members of the UKTPO. The UK Trade 
Policy observatory (UKTPO), a partnership between 
the University of Sussex and Chatham House, is an 
independent expert group that: 
1) initiates, comments on and analyses trade policy 
proposals for the UK; and 
2) trains British policy makers, negotiators and other 
interested parties through tailored training packages. 
The UKTPO is committed to engaging with a wide variety of 
stakeholders to ensure that the UK’s international trading 
environment is reconstructed in a manner that benefits all 
in Britain and is fair to Britain, the EU and the world. The 
Observatory offers a wide range of expertise and services 
to help support government departments, international 
organisations and businesses to strategise and develop 
new trade policies in the post-Brexit era.
For further information on this theme or the work of the UK 
Trade Observatory, please contact:
Professor L Alan Winters 
Director of the UK Trade Policy Observatory
Email: uktpo@sussex.ac.uk
